The World Trade Organization and United States\u27 Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System by Sprance, William R.
American University International Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 5 Article 2
1998
The World Trade Organization and United States'
Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities
of the System
William R. Sprance
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sprance, William R. "The World Trade Organization and United States' Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the
System." American University International Law Review 13, no. 5 (1998): 1225-1265.
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND
UNITED STATES' SOVEREIGNTY: THE
]POLITICAL AND PROCEDURAL
REALITIES OF THE SYSTEM
WILLIAM R. SPRANCE
Introduction ......................................... ... 1226
I. W hat is Sovereignty ...................... ...... ......... 1227
A. Surrendering Sovereignty? ........ ......................  1231
B. Critics' Arguments Against the WTO .................. 1233
II. A Brief History of GAIT Dispute Resolution ............. 1236
A. The Tokyo Round ...................................... 1240
B. The Uruguay Round .................. .............. 1242
III. The World Trade Organization ............................ 1243
A. WTO Voting Procedure ................................ 1245
B. The Dispute Settlement Body ........................... 1246
1. W TO Panel Procedure .............................. 1247
2. Adoption of Panel Reports .......................... 1249
C. The Appellate Body ......................... ......... 1250
IV. United States' Concerns About the Dispute
Settlement System ................... 1251
A . Section 301 ............................................. 1252
B. Amended Section 301 .................... ..... 1254
V. Dispute Settlement Overview ............................. 1256
A. The Fuji Film Case ............................... .... 1259
B. The Dirty Oil Case ............................ ......... 1260
Conclusion ..................................... 1263
* Counsel, Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
for Gulf War Illnesses, 1997-Present. Department of the Navy. Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, 1993-1997. United States Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps.
1989-1992. B.A., Vassar (1985); J.D., Northeastern (1988): LL.M. (International
Law) Georgetown (1996). This article is dedicated to my parents, Bill and Eloise
Sprance, as vel as my wife Cathy and daughter Elizabeth.
1225
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
INTRODUCTION
The future of United States sovereignty is perhaps the most con-
tentious issue surrounding United States membership in the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). Emotions run high on all sides of the
issue, especially for opponents of the WTO, such as Ralph Nader,
who are convinced that the WTO will usurp American sovereignty.,
Advocates for the WTO, such as former United States Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR") Michael Kantor, contend that not only is Ameri-
can sovereignty protected under the Uruguay Round Agreements (the
"UR Agreements"), but the UR Agreements will actually open for-
eign markets to American goods. 2 Congress gave high priority to
United States' membership in the WTO and approved "Fast Track"
3
consideration of the UR Agreements. Ultimately, Congress passed
the required implementing legislation,4 which the President signed,
and the United States joined the WTO.5
1. See GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong. 353-69 (1994)
(statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate, Public Citizen) (setting forth the
reasons why the WTO will undermine American sovereignty) [hereinafter GATT
Hearing].
2. See id. at 41 (statement of Ambassador Michael Kantor) (testifying that the
UR Agreements will require other countries to be as open in their trade practices as
the United States).
3. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2191 (West 1996) (authorizing the expedited considera-
tion of trade implementing legislation). In order to prevent members of Congress
from delaying consideration of legislation, Section 2191 (d) provides that:
No amendment to an implementing bill or approval resolution shall be in order in ei-
ther the House of Representatives or the Senate; and no motion to suspend the appli-
cation of this subsection shall be in order in either House, nor shall it be in order in
either House for the Presiding Officer to entertain a request to suspend the application
of this subsection by unanimous consent.
Id. Under Sections 2191(f) and (g), Congress cannot debate whether or not to con-
sider implementing legislation. See id. Debate on the merits of implementing leg-
islation is limited to no more than twenty hours in both the House and the Senate.
See id.
4. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2903(a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii) (West 1996) (requiring the Presi-
dent, after entering into a trade agreement, to submit to the House and Senate a fi-
nal copy of the agreement along with a draft of the implementing bill and a state-
ment of administrative action proposed to implement the trade agreement).
5. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
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Part I of this paper begins by defining sovereignty-comparing the
"power" and "rule oriented" approaches to sovereignty-and dis-
cussing whether the United States has surrendered its sovereignty by
joining the WTO. As part of the analysis, the paper discusses the
Helms-Burton Act and the "power" element that exists within the
dispute resolution system.
Part II examines the arguments of critics against the WTO, fol-
lowed by a brief history of dispute settlement from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") to the Uruguay Round.
Part III shifts the focus to the WTO's structure and voting procedure.
Part IV addresses United States' concerns about the new dispute set-
tlement system, emphasizing Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Part
V provides an overview of cases decided by the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") in which the United States was a party. The paper
concludes with a summation of the reasons why the United States has
not surrendered its sovereignty by joining the WTO.
I. WHAT IS SOVEREIGNTY?
Sovereignty is formally defined as the international independence
of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its inter-
nal affairs without foreign interference. Practically speaking, sover-
eignty is a nation's independence from other governments and its
freedom of choice to act politically.7 Definitions notwithstanding,
however, sovereignty is becoming more difficult to define as nations
become increasingly interdependent.8 The public debate over the
United States' membership in the WTO, which reached near hysteri-
cal levels, further muddied the waters. One anti-WTO advertisement
went so far as to show a policeman in a GATT uniform shattering the
Capitol building with a sledgehammer. 9 Such inflammatory rhetoric
6. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See Joe Cobb, The Real Threat to U.S. Sovereignty. THE HERrrAGE
LECTURES No. 497, 1, 1-2 (1994) (explaining that the UR Agreements threaten
special interest groups and the protectionist legislation they lobby Congress to
pass) [hereinafter HERITAGE LECTURES].
8. See John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO:
Significance and Challenges, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGAIZATION: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEVORK FOR THE 21ST CEN'URY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 5, 12 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
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made responsible debate difficult and created the false notion that the
United States was trading its citizenship interests in favor of its con-
sumer interests.10 Lost among the sound and fury, however, was the
fact that United States membership in the WTO does not diminish
Americans' rights as citizens."
Opponents of the WTO favor a "power oriented" approach to sov-
ereignty that downplays the importance of international agreements
and allows nations to maintain their freedom of unilateral action de-
spite their international obligations.' 2 What places the critics at odds
with the WTO is that it operates under a "rule oriented" system,
which is based upon legally binding rules enforced by an effective
dispute resolution system.' 3 The primary goal of the rule oriented
system is to maximize stability and predictability. 14 Under a rule ori-
ented system, however, nations usually submit to a dispute resolution
authority that serves as a referee.' 
5
The power oriented approach emphasizes unilateral action as a
means of dispute resolution. The problem with unilateral action,
however, is that international trade does not occur in a vacuum, and
the growing interdependence of international economies limits the
independence of government action. 16 Consequently, despite its su-
9. See Jeopardized by GATT 100 U.S. Environmental Laws (advertisement),
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at A15.
10. See Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Re-
ports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?, I I ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 329 (1996).
11. See id. at 329 (explaining that much of the criticism directed against WTO
dispute settlement procedures stems from the fear it will add pressure against spe-
cial protectionist interests that violate both American consumer and citizenship in-
terests).
12. See Susan Hainsworth, Sovereignty, Economic Integration and the World
Trade Organization, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 583, 590 (1995) (arguing that eco-
nomic integration is altering the concept of sovereignty and has made it almost
meaningless for an isolated state).
13. See id. at 590.
14. See id.
15. See id. (explaining that a rule oriented system is enforced by an effective
and impartial dispute resolution system).
16. See Schaefer, supra note 10, at 332 (discussing how the common definition
of sovereignty as "a nation's independence from other governments" is changing
due to economic interdependence). To illustrate his point, the author emphasizes
that the United States economy is affected by interest rates in Europe, savings rates
in Japan, and growth rates in Asia and South America. See id.
[ 13:12251228
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perpower status, the United States does not have carte blanche to act
unilaterally without considering the consequences. In fact, super-
power status confers greater responsibility since the more powerful
the nation, the more significant the repercussions of its actions.
Despite being rule oriented, a significant "power politics" element
exists within the WTO system. There are times when a nation will
act unilaterally, regardless of what the UR Agreements say or what
WTO members think, as exemplified by the passage of the Helms-
Burton Act ("Helms-Burton") in 1996.17 Helms-Burton, created to
hasten the establishment of democracy in Cuba, is comprised of four
titles: Title I strengthens the existing embargo against Cuba, Title II
delineates the requirements for lifting sanctions on Cuba, Title III
creates a private cause of action in United States district courts for
any United States national who had property confiscated in Cuba af-
ter January 1, 1959,18 and Title IV excludes from the United States
certain aliens who traffic in confiscated property belonging to United
States' nationals.
19
The European Union ("EU") was so angered by passage of Helms-
Burton, especially Title Ill, that its ministers gathered to condemn it
and complain about its potential effect upon the international trade
system.20 In retaliation, the EU unanimously passed blocking legisla-
tion.21 On October 29, 1996, the EU passed additional legislation al-
lowing Europeans to sue for the recovery of damages assessed by
American courts pursuant to Helms-Burton. 22
Taking a stand against the "extraterritorial" reach of Helms-
Burton,23 the EU pressed for the formation of a DSB investigative
17. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091 (West 1996). The Helms-Burton Act is formally
called the "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996."
18. See id. § 6082.
19. See id. § 6091.
20. See Anthony M. Solis, The Long Ann of U.S. Law: The Helins-Burton Act,
19 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 709, 727 (1997) (providing an excellent over-
view of Helms-Burton and its potential effect on both international law and trade).
21. See id. at 727 n.110 (citing EU to Allow Countersuits to Foil U.S. Anti-
Cuba Law, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1996, at A 1.).
22. See id. at 727.
23. See Edward Roussel, Europe to File Protest Over Helms-Burton Act,
MLMi HERALD, Oct. 2, 1996 (visited Dec. 4. 1997) <http://www.fiu.edul-fcf/
europe.protest.helms.html>.
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panel24 and requested consultations with the United States on May 3,
1996.25 The United States originally rejected the formation of a panel
but relented on November 20, 1996.26 On February 20, 1997, how-
ever, the United States asserted that the newly formed panel did not
have the competence to proceed because Helms-Burton was a matter
of national security.27 Months of negotiation ensued, with the United
States ultimately offering to modify Helms-Burton in exchange for
European efforts to discourage investment in Cuba.28 After making
its offer, the United States warned the EU that it would not amend
Helms-Burton if the EU went forward with its complaint at the
DSB.2 9 Consequently, on April 25, 1997, the EU agreed to suspend
its complaint 30 but could reinstate the complaint if a settlement is not
reached.
3 1
If the EU reinstates its complaint, the panel's investigation into
Helms-Burton could have significant effects on the United States and
international trade.32 If the panel decides that Helms-Burton violates
the GATT, then the United States would have to amend Helms-
Burton or face sanctions. However, if the panel upholds Helms-
Burton and the United States keeps it in place, WTO members will
question the United States' commitment both to the WTO and the
24. See Solis, supra note 20, at 734 (noting that Canada and Mexico also joined
the EU in its request).
25. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Dis-
putes (visited Nov. 18, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>
[hereinafter Dispute Overview].
26. See Solis, supra note 20, at 734 n.152 (citing WTO Investigation of Helms-
Burton on Track: U.S. Accepts Panel Formation, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) at A-
3 (Nov. 21, 1996)).
27. See id. at 734 (citing David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejects Role for World Court in
Trade Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.).
28. See Thomas W. Lippman & Paul Blustein, Administration Offers Compro-
mise to Europeans Over Helms-Burton Act, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at A23
(noting that under the Administration's offer, it would ask Congress to modify spe-
cific parts of Helms-Burton if the EU adopts the principle that corporations should
not profit from investing in confiscated property).
29. See Kathleen Kenna, Deal Avoids Cuba Trade Battle, TORONTO STAR, Apr.
12, 1997, at A3.
30. See Dispute Overview, supra note 25.
31. See Kenna, supra note 29, at A3 (reminding the reader that Congress will
have to approve any deal between the United States and the EU).
32. See Solis, supra note 20, at 734-35.
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international trading system.33 Helms-Burton has already provoked
the passing of retaliatory legislation by the EU, and it may provoke
similar legislation that could threaten the WTO's very existence.
A. SURRENDERING SOVEREIGNTY?
By joining the WTO, the United States made the sovereign deci-
sion to abide by the UR Agreements and avoid actions that are incon-
sistent with them. Thus, one can say that the United States has sacri-
ficed some sovereignty; however, all treaties give up some
"sovereignty" in this respect. 34 Furthermore, given global economic
interdependence and the limits it places on unilateral action, the "sur-
render" of sovereignty is largely illusory.
Any sovereignty the United States relinquishes can be analogized
to the sovereignty an athletic team surrenders when it plays a game
judged by a referee. The referee is present to ensure that teams play
by the rules and to penalize those who do not. Without a referee, the
game would result in chaos as the teams argue whether or not a foul
was committed. Likewise, it is difficult for trading partners involved
in a dispute to admit discrimination against each other's goods. Even
though a team submits to a referee's authority, the team's ability to
play the game is not diminished. In fact, the referee "levels the play-
ing field" by enforcing the rules equally. This "leveling of the playing
field" is a major reason the United States supported the creation of
the WTO. 5
In fact, as a member of the WTO, the United States will have more
opportunities to influence the actions of its trading partners by
bringing complaints to the DSB.36 The DSB offers stability to inter-
national trade by providing a neutral forum for dispute resolution. In-
stead of immediately entering into a confrontation with trading part-
ners, the United States can bring a complaint to the DSB and let it
33. See id. at 735.
34. See Schaefer, supra note 10, at 330.
35. GAT Hearing, supra note 1, at 39 (statement of Ambassador Michael
Kantor) (testifying that the UR Agreements give the United States the level playing
field it has sought in trade because for the first time all WTO members must agree
to the same set of trade rules).
36. See Hainsworth, supra note 12, at 591 (explaining that the transfer and
pooling of sovereignty at the international level allows a state more authority and
opportunity to exercise control over other states' actions).
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decide. By bringing a complaint, the United States runs the risk of
losing a case, but that is the same risk it would run in a United States
court. Unilateral action may seem a more powerful way to respond to
GATT violations, but unilateral action, as demonstrated by Helms-
Burton, can provoke retaliatory action, which threatens the future of
the WTO. Moreover, when the United States brings a successful
complaint to the DSB, the panel report carries the weight of WTO
members behind it. A member could ignore the panel's recommen-
dations; but would risk being known as a cheat, which could be bad
for business.
The very act of acceding to the WTO was an exercise of both
American sovereignty and constitutional authority, 37 and despite
agreeing to use WTO dispute settlement procedures, Congress retains
the constitutional authority to disregard the UR Agreements when
warranted by national interests. 38 Congress has the authority to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, 39 but it delegated authority to the
President to negotiate the UR Agreements. 40 Because the UR
Agreements are neither self-executing executive agreements nor
treaties,41 they required implementing legislation to bring them into
force. 42 Therefore, when Congress drafted the implementing legisla-
tion, it took steps to protect American sovereignty. First, Congress
37. See Schaefer, supra note 10, at 330.
38. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Post-Uruguay Round Future of
Section 301, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1297, 1307 (1994) (stating that the
WTO's dispute settlement rules do not limit the sovereignty of the United States or
any other member).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
40. See 19 U.S.C. § 2902(a) (1994) (granting the President authority to negoti-
ate agreements regarding tariff barriers); id. § 2902(b)-(c) (authorizing the negotia-
tion of bilateral agreements regarding tariff and non-tariff barriers); id. § 2902(d)
(providing that before the President enters into agreements under subsection (b) or
(c) he must consult with the House Ways and Means Committee as well as other
Congressional committees or joint committees that have jurisdiction over areas ef-
fected by the legislation).
41. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriousv: Reflections on
Free Fonn Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221,
1223 (1995) (suggesting, in part, that the WTO may be unconstitutional because a
bicameral majority of Congress approved the implementing legislation for the
WTO instead of a two third's Senate majority as required by the Treaty Clause,
Article II, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution).
42. See 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994) (approving the UR Agreements and the
Statement of Administrative Action).
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provided that in the event of a conflict with the UR Agreements,
United States' law would take precedence. 43 Second, the imple-
menting bill states that the UR Agreements do not have the power to
change United States law.44
In addition to the legislative protection of American sovereignty,
the Supreme Court has held that Congress can enact legislation in-
consistent with preexisting international agreements, and the subse-
quent legislation supersedes inconsistent provisions of an existing
treaty or international agreement. 45 Thus, Congress, without any ap-
proval from the WTO, is free to pass legislation modifying the
United States' obligations under the UR Agreements. 4" Congress also
has the authority to withdraw the United States from the WTO. "7
B. CRITICS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE WTO
Whoever said "politics makes strange bedfellows" must have en-
visioned the forces opposed to the WTO. One would hardly expect
Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan to agree on anything, yet both were
vehemently opposed to the WTO. Ralph Nader asserted that the
WTO would become a new United Nations and replace the entire
GATI" system.48 Pat Buchanan described the WTO as a "Supreme
43. See id. § 3512(a)(1) (requiring that: "'No provision of an% of the Uruguay
Round Agreements nor the application of any such provision to any person or cir-
cumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States, shall have ef-
fect.").
44. See id. § 3512(a)(2)(A) (providing that nothing in the Act shall be con-
strued to amend or modify any law of the United States. including any law relating
to the protection of human, animal, or plant life: or health, the protection of the en-
vironment, or worker safety); see also id. § 3512(a)(2xB) (asserting that the Act
does not limit "any authority conferred under an)' law of the United States. includ-
ing Section 2411 of the title, unless specifically provided for in this Act.")
45. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190. 194 (1888) (holding that "[Ihen
the stipulations [of a treaty] are not self-executing, the) can only be enforced pur-
suant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much subject
to modification and repeal by Congress as legislation upon an) other subject"); see
also Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238. 247 (1889) (holding that when an act of
Congress is in conflict with a treaty. the Court must follow the statutory enactments
of its own government).
46. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 195 (holding that whether the United States
chooses to observe its international obligations is not a matter for judicial determi-
nation but one of diplomacy and legislation).
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 3535(b)-(c) (1994).
48. See GATTHearing, supra note 1. at 359 (statement of Ralph Nader).
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Court of world trade" and made opposition to it a theme of his cam-
paign for the Republican presidential nomination.49
State officials were particularly concerned that WTO members
would challenge state laws in the DSB instead of challenging them in
state court. As an example, they pointed to the Minnesota micro-
brewery case as proof that state laws were in danger. 51 State officials
were also concerned that the USTR might use state laws as bargain-
ing chips when negotiating with trading partners, thus turning the of-
fice of the USTR into a de facto enforcement arm of the WTO.52 One
state official has warned that the first time a state law is challenged
based upon a WTO panel decision, "all hell is going to break
loose. 5 3 Ralph Nader issued similar dire warnings.
54
Various environmental groups also opposed the WTO, arguing
that it would create pollution havens throughout the world and stifle
innovation in the areas of healthcare and the environment. 55 Critics
also attacked the WTO's "one nation, one vote" system, expressing
49. Pat Buchanan, Speech Delivered at Spartanburg, S.C. (C-SPAN television
broadcast, Feb. 28, 1996).
50. See David S. Cloud, Critics Fear GATT May Declare Open Season On
U.S. Laws, 52 CONG. WKLY. REP. 2005, 2009 (1994).
51. See id. In 1991, Canada challenged a Minnesota law giving a tax break to
microbreweries. See id. The tax break was intended to assist small beer brewers
and was available to foreign and out-of-state microbrewers who sold beer in Min-
nesota. See id. Canada challenged the law on the grounds that it discriminated
against larger brewers. See id. A GATT panel ruled in Canada's favor, but Minne-
sota refused to comply with the decision. See id.
52. See id. at 2010.
53. Id.
54. See GATT Hearing, supra note 1, at 354 (statement of Ralph Nader) (as-
serting that under the WTO, members will be able to challenge American state laws
in Geneva, and state representatives will be shut out of the process).
55. See id. at 209 (statement of Brent Blackwelder, President of Friends of the
Earth) (testifying that the "GATT essentially addresses the environment by omis-
sion and leaves the strong likelihood that it will foster more pollution havens
throughout the world"). Mr. Blackwelder specified the following areas where he
thinks environmental laws will conflict with free trade policies: hazardous waste,
recycling and waste reduction, pesticides and food safety, air and water pollution,
natural resource protection, energy conservation, and wildlife protection. See id. at
209-10.
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dissatisfaction with the lack of weighted voting"5 and the dispropor-
tionate share of the cost the United States would bear.57
The critics paint a bleak picture of the WTO as a monster waiting
to wreak havoc on America's economy and laws. At the core of the
criticism is the erroneous belief that by joining the WTO, the United
States has involuntarily surrendered both the right to act on its own
behalf and the power to prevent other states from interfering in its af-
fairs. As previously stated, the UR Agreements do not preempt fed-
eral or state laws that are inconsistent with GATI. 58 and the WTO
may not overturn either an act of Congress or any portion of the Con-
stitution. Moreover, the implementing bill protects state laws by re-
quiring that the USTR establish a federal-state consultation process
for addressing issues under the UR Agreements that will or may have
a direct effect on a state. 59 Criticisms notwithstanding, the United
States will benefit significantly from membership in the WTO.6 If
the United States did not join the WTO, its "sovereignty" may have
been protected, but the United States would be economically isolated
from its major trading partners.61
56. See id. at 350 (statement of Ralph Nader) (stating that the United States has
never entered into a major international economic agreement without weighted
voting or a veto).
57. See id. at 122 (statement of Kevin Kearns, President, U.S. Business and In-
dustrial Counsel) (stating that the United States will have to bear most of the cost
of the WTO, but vill only have one vote).
58. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
59. See id. § 3512(b)(1)(A)(B). The statute provides that the Federal-State con-
sultation process shall include procedures under which (i) the states are informed of
matters under the Uruguay Round Agreements that directly relate to them, (ii) the
states can then submit information and advice on those matters to the Trade Repre-
sentative, and (iii) the Trade Representative will consider this information and ad-
vice when formulating official United States' positions. See id.
60. See Results of tile Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations. Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 115 (1994) [hereinafter Results of tie Un-
guay Round] (statement of Professor John H. Jackson). Prof. Jackson lists the fol-
lowing benefits of WTO membership for the United States: first, members must
sign on to all the UR Agreements-they cannot pick and choose; second, the WTO
serves as an umbrella organization under which the UR Agreements are annexed,
so the WTO provides a legal framework: third, the WTO extends the GATT struc-
ture to the new areas of intellectual property and services; and fourth, the WTO has
a balanced decision making apparatus that will not invade members' sovereignty.
See id.
61. See World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Conunis-
sion Act: Hearing Before tile Senate Comm. on Finance. 104th Cong. 14 (19951
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GATT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
In order to understand how far dispute settlement has come under
the WTO, one must examine where the GATT dispute settlement be-
gan. Since the creation of the GATT, the United States has been the
most active user of the dispute settlement system.62 Of the 207 panel
cases brought before the original GATT, the United States and the
EU have been plaintiff or defendant in 190 of them.
63
After World War II, the United States, along with its allies, real-
ized that new political and economic institutions were necessary to
promote peaceful international relations. 64 Consequently, in 1944,
representatives from the allied nations met at the Bretton Woods
Conference in New Hampshire,65 which resulted in the charters cre-
ating the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.66 During
the Conference, the allies agreed that an International Trade Organi-
zation ("ITO") should be established, and the task of drafting the
charter fell to the U.N.67 The allies envisioned that the ITO would
govern international trade, enforce the rules against trade barriers and
restrictive trade practices, and settle trade disputes between member
states.
68
In 1946, the U.N. adopted a resolution to draft the ITO Charter.
69
Simultaneously, nations were negotiating for a general agreement on
tariffs and trade, which would create reciprocal obligations to reduce
tariffs.70 In 1947 at the Geneva Conference, both the GATT and the
(statement of Jerry R. Junkins, President and Chief Executive Officer, Texas In-
struments Corporation) (explaining that economic isolation is not a viable choice
for the United States because it would lead to a shrinking economy and place
America's leadership in the world at risk).
62. See Jackson. supra note 8, at 14 (stating that the United States was the most
frequent applicant for GATT dispute settlement procedures).
63. See Gary N. Horlick, Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Will the United States
Play by the Rules, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 163, 164 (1994).
64. See 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-
1992) at 2670 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1994) [hereinafter Stewart].
65. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 5.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2670.
69. See id. at 2671.
70. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 5.
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draft ITO Charter were completed.7 1 The GAT" was supposed to be
an interim agreement created to implement multilateral tariff reduc-
tions.72 The ITO Charter attempted to establish a permanent organi-
zation and addressed three phases of dispute resolution: consultations
and negotiations, referral of disputes to the ITO, and referral of dis-
putes to the International Court of Justice.73
In 1948, the U.N. finalized the ITO Charter in Havana,74 and later
that year, the GATT7 5 came provisionally into force. The draft ITO
Charter was then submitted to the nations for ratification.76 The
United States Congress refused to approve it, however, and by 1951,
it became apparent that the ITO was moribund.77 By default, GATT
became the major treaty system for international trade even though it
was originally intended to be a temporary organization administered
by the ITO.
78
From its inception the GATT suffered from certain "birth defects"
that compromised its effectiveness. 79 The original GATT contained
little guidance for dispute settlement,80 providing only for consulta-
tions and negotiations among parties involved in a trade dispute. It
did not provide for either dispute settlement panels or an appellate
body. In 1955, GATT members began referring their disputes to pan-
els of experts, and the use of panels became customary.81 Panel
71. See id. at 5-6.
72. See Stewart, supra note 64. at 2672.
73. Seeid.at2671.
74. See id.
75. See generally General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947. 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
76. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 6.
77. See id.
78. See id. At the time of its inception. GATT was to be applied provisionally
for several years and "then would be put under the umbrella of and conformed to
the ITO Charter." Id. Since the ITO was never created, however, "'the GATT
gradually became the focus for international government cooperation on trade
matters." Id.
79. See id. at 7 (explaining that the problems with the GATT included a lack of
institutional structure, ambiguity about member states' abilities to make decisions,
unclear legal status resulting in confusion by members and the public, and defects
in the procedures for dispute settlement).
80. See id. at 13.
81. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2695.
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findings and recommendations, however, were not binding on the
disputants.
82
In 1955, Article XXII of the GATT was modified to allow con-
tracting parties to intervene in a dispute if the original parties could
not come to an agreement. 83 Article XXIII was amended in the same
year to allow GATT members to suspend concessions or retaliate
against each other if justified. 84 Cooperation among respondent gov-
ernments resulted in the successful implementation of the early panel
decisions.
85
The years 1952-1958 were the peak years of GATT dispute activ-
ity. 86 The period after 1958, however, was one of decreased dispute
82. See John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement,
Codes of Conduct, in THE NEW GATT, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 60
(S. Collins & B. Bosworth eds., 1994).
83. See GATT, supra note 75, art. XXII (stating that each contracting party
shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding such representations as may be made by another contracting
party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this agreement).
84. See id. art. XXIII. The GATT provides, in part:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment
of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter,
make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties
which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall
give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
Id.
85. See David M. Schwarz, WTO Dispute Resolution Panels: Failing To Pro-
tect Against Conflicts Of Interest, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 957, 959 (1995)
(citing Robert E. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes, 16 THAMES
ESSAY 7, 9-10 (1978)) (noting that "between 1948 and 1959, approximately 80%
of the thirteen panel adjudications yielded completely or partially satisfactory re-
sults.").
86. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
TRADE DIPLOMACY 235 (1990) (analyzing the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures from 1959-1970).
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settlement activity, 87 precipitated by an increasingly hostile attitude
toward dispute settlement by GATT members. 88 The situation con-
tinued to deteriorate so that by the late 1960s "government represen-
tatives were openly challenging the fairness of the [dispute settle-
ment] procedure on the ground that there was no longer any
reciprocity of legal obligation."
89
During the 1960s, the emerging GATT power structure, comprised
of the United States, the European Community ("EC"), and Japan,
experienced a series of unresolved disputes. 90 From 1960-1969, only
ten complaints were brought to the GATT, and only three dispute
panels were established between 1963-1970. 91 It was obvious that
GATT members had lost confidence in the dispute resolution system
because it allowed parties to block the formation of panels, reject
panelists, and delay a panel's collection of information. 92 The most
significant problem, however, was that parties could block the adop-
tion of panel reports and recommendations, 93 thus vetoing adoption
indefinitely. Without an effective means of enforcement, the dispute
settlement system was substantially weakened.
Besides problems with dispute resolution, the original GAIT was
also plagued by institutional weaknesses. The major weakness was
the problem of free riders.94 Under the original GATT, a member did
not have to adhere to all of the GATT agreements, but rather could
pick and choose which agreements it wished to sign, thus creating a
GAIT "a la carte.' 95 The "pick and choose" system created a sce-
87. See id. (explaining that from 1959-1961 no GATT complaints were filed).
From 1962-1963 only six complaints were filed, and after that no complaints were
filed until 1967. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. (explaining that GATF members described legal proceedings as un-
friendly confrontations).
90. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2680 (explaining that the disputes between
the United States and the EC led to unilateral retaliation and counter retaliation that
"highlighted the substantive and procedural deficiencies of the [dispute settlement]
mechanism").
91. See id. at 2679.
92. See The General Agreement on Tarffs and Trade: Uniguay Round Should
Produce Overall U.S. Economic Gains, United States General Accounting Office,
Report to Congress 28 (1994) [hereinafter GAO Report].
93. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 10.
94. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 25.
95. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 11.
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nario where country X was required to grant most favored nation
("MFN") status to country Y under a GATT agreement, even though
country Y did not adhere to the same agreement and did not offer re-
ciprocal MFN status to country X. Thus, country Y was given a "free
ride" by receiving benefits from agreements to which it did not ad-
here. To make matters worse, country X could not "cross retaliate"
against country Y by suspending concessions on an agreement to
which country Y adhered.96
A. THE TOKYO ROUND
In 1973, the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations commenced in
an attempt to resolve some of the problems with the dispute settle-
ment system.97 The negotiations specifically addressed panel delays
and the importance of creating impartial panels. 98 The United States
hoped that the dispute settlement process could be improved and that
notification procedures could be implemented for restrictive trade
practices that were either in effect or about to be taken. 99 The United
States proposed an automatic right to establish dispute panels as well
as precise time limits for each stage of the dispute settlement proc-
ess.100 The United States also wanted panel reports to fully explain
their findings in writing and wanted the GATT to maintain a roster of
eligible panel experts.'
0'
The resulting document'0 2 partially modified the dispute resolution
procedures. 10 3 Nevertheless, the Tokyo Round was ultimately a dis-
96. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 26.
97. See Schwarz, supra note 85, at 962-64 (providing an excellent history of
GATT dispute settlement panels).
98. See id. (citing Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After The Toklyo
Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 147-48 (1980))
(noting that the weakness of dispute resolution was a primary issue at the Tokyo
Round negotiations).
99. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2689.
100. See id. at 2689, 2691.
101. See id. at 2689-90.
102. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
ment and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, reprinted in 26 BISD 210 (1980).
103. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2692.
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appointment because it did not alter dispute resolution procedures,,J
but only codified existing informal practices. 
0 5
From 1980 to 1981, the dispute settlement system again proved in-
adequate when the United States brought a series of bitterly contested
complaints against the EC, in which the EC blocked the adoption of
all panel reports. 10 6 By this time, the United States was convinced
that the continued existence of unresolved disputes challenged both
GATT principles and the system itself.10 7 Realizing that the dispute
settlement system was inadequate, the GATT Secretariat decided to
formalize and strengthen it.108 Panels had limited legal ability to deal
with complex trade disputes, and legal mistakes in panel reports were
becoming increasingly common.
10 9
In 1983, the post of Director, Office of Legal Affairs was created
with a staff of three attorneys. 10 In order to improve the quality of
panelists, the Secretariat asked its members to create a roster of
qualified panelists from the private sector. 1 ' The changes to the
system were effective, and by the late 1980s, the quality of panel de-
cisions had improved considerably." 
2
104. See Schwarz, supra note 85, at 963 n.48 (citing U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPLr'E SETrIF-rL ENT UNDER
THE GATT AND TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS, Pub. 1793 (Rep. to the Comm. on
Finance, U.S. Senate, on Investigation No. 332-212 under Section 332(g) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (1985)).
105. See id. at 963 (explaining that the Tokyo Round Understanding failed to
provide any "substantive solutions for the delaying tactics in panel procedures, but
it did establish a time frame for panel composition").
106. See ROBERT E. HUDEC. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1994) (providing an ex-
cellent history of GATT dispute settlement procedures).
107. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 29.
108. See Hudec, supra note 106, at 137.
109. See id.
110. Seeid. at 138.
111. See id. at 168 (explaining that the Secretariat had the authority to name
panelists from the roster if the disputants could not agree upon panel membership).
112. See id. at 138 (explaining that even though the legal office did well, it never
achieved full success).
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B. THE URUGUAY ROUND
In 1982, the United States proposed the beginning of another
round of multilateral trade negotiations."13 The suggestion was met
with strong resistance from both developed and underdeveloped
GATT countries that thought it was too soon for another round of
negotiations."14 Nevertheless, in 1988, the GATT Ministerial Confer-
ence issued the Punta Del Este Declaration establishing the negoti-
ating framework for the Uruguay Round trade negotiations."
15
Among the goals specified for the negotiations were strengthening
the dispute settlement system, emphasizing oversight and enforce-
ment, and improving the GATT decision making process.116
In anticipation of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Congress
passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act ("1988 Trade
Act"), which set forth the United States' negotiating objectives at the
Uruguay Round.' 17 The United States' overall negotiating objectives
included the creation of foreign market access, the reduction of trade
barriers, and the reduction of trade distorting practices. 118 Predicta-
bly, the principal dispute settlement objectives were for a more ef-
fective dispute settlement system and for the more expeditious set-
tlement of disputes.' 19 The United States also wanted to eliminate the
blocking of panel findings and recommendations by making the re-
sults binding on the disputants. 20 Under the old GATT, consensus
had to exist among members for panel adoption to occur, which
meant that all members had to agree to adoption before a panel report
could be implemented.
121
113. See id. at 180 (stating that the United States specifically wanted services,
intellectual property, and investment covered by the GATT).
114. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2690.
115. See GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986,
25 I.L.M. 1623.
116. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 30.
117. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994) (delineating the
United States trade negotiation objectives).
118. See 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a).
119. See id. § 2901(b)(1).
120. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2733.
121. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 27.
1242 [13:1225
THE WTO AND UNITED STATES SOVEREIGNTY
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The Uruguay Round was the most ambitious and successful trade
negotiation ever undertaken,' with much of the effort focused on
improving the legal system. In 1991, the GATT Director General
prepared and released a draft text of the treaty clauses covering the
entire Uruguay Round. 123 The draft was circulated to GATT mem-
bers, and in 1993, the GATI Director General released the final draft
of the Uruguay Round Agreements.1
2 4
The WTO is essentially a mini-charter that facilitates and imple-
ments the UR Agreements. 125 Unlike the ITO proposed in the 1940s,
however, the WTO is entirely institutional and procedural in nature,
incorporating the UR Agreements into annexes. 126 Unlike the previ-
ous GATT, the WTO charter delineates the legal authority of the
Secretariat, Director General, and staff. 127 The cornerstone "rules" of
the WTO are the MFN and National Treatment clauses. The MFN
clause requires that the United States treat the products and services
of other countries equally under its laws. 12 8 National treatment re-
quires that goods and services of other countries receive treatment no
less favorable than that given to like products of national origin.'
29
The two governing bodies of the WTO are the Ministerial Confer-
ence and the General Council, both of which are composed of repre-
sentatives from all members.' 30 The Ministerial Conference shall
meet at least once every two years and has authority to take action
122. See Jackson, supra note 82, at 63.
123. See id. at 65.
124. See id.
125. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 10.
126. See Jackson, supra note 82, at 66.
127. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Dec. 15, 1993,
33 I.L.M. 13, art. 6 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (explaining that the Ministerial
Conference appoints the Director-General and adopts regulations setting out the
powers, duties, conditions of service, and term of office of the Director General,
who then heads the Secretariat and appoints its staff).
128. See GATT, supra note 75, art. I.
129. See id. art. III.
130. See WTO Agreement, supra note 127, art. 4 (reporting that the Ministerial
Conference meets every two years and is responsible for carrying out the functions
of the WTO). The General Council governs the meetings of the Ministerial Confer-
ence. See id. art. 4.2.
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under any of the UR Agreements.' 3 1 In the intervals between meet-
ings of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council will govern
the WTO and will meet as required to discharge the duties of the
DSB.
132
The Dispute Settlement Understanding 133 ("DSU") imposes strict
time limits on the dispute settlement process. Panels should finish
their work in nine months if there is no appeal and in twelve months
if there is an appeal. 134 Moreover, panel reports can no longer be
blocked, 135 and parties now have an automatic right of appeal to the
newly created Appellate Body.136 Furthermore, a WTO member must
accede to all the UR Agreements before it can join, thus, resolving
any "free rider" problem. 137 Additionally, cross-retaliation is author-
ized, so a member may retaliate under one agreement when a viola-
tion has occurred under another. 38
In comparison to other international institutions, the WTO is a
comparatively lean operation with a staff of 454 that is expected to
total 491.139 WTO officials want additional staff and more operating
funds, but their requests have been denied because member govern-
131. See id. art. 4.1.
132. See id. art. 4.2.
133. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSUI.
134. See id. art. 20 (declaring that the parties may agree to a different time limit).
Absent an agreement, however, "the period from the establishment of the panel by
the DSB until the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption shall
not as a general rule exceed nine months where the panel report is not appealed or
twelve months where the report is appealed." Id.
135. See id. art. 16.4 (noting that within 60 days after the date of circulation of a
panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a
party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report).
136. See generally id. art. 17.
137. See WTO Agreement, supra note 127, art. 14.1 (stating that the acceptance
of membership in the WTO shall apply to this agreement and Multilateral Trade
Agreements annexed hereto).
138. See DSU, supra note 133, art, 22.2.
139. See Bruce Stokes, Up and Crawling, NAT'LJ., Mar. 30, 1996, at 710.
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ments seem intent on limiting the bureaucratic bloat that has afflicted
the U.N.141
A. WTO VOTING PROCEDURE
Under the previous GATT, voting procedures were based on con-
sensus, which was never formally defined and came to mean una-
nimity. 141 Under the WTO, consensus is formally defined as when
the DSB makes a decision and a member who is present at the meet-
ing makes no formal objection. 142 Importantly, consensus no longer
means unanimity, and members that are absent from the meeting, or
who abstain, cannot block consensus. 143 Moreover, only the Ministe-
rial Conference and the General Council have authority to adopt
authoritative interpretations of the UR Agreements. 14 If WTO mem-
bers cannot reach consensus on an interpretation, then a three-
fourth's majority vote is required to adopt an interpretation. 145 Only
the Ministerial Conference and General Council, however, have
authority to amend the WTO agreements.
146
Any WTO member may initiate an amendment to one of the UR
Agreements by submitting a proposal to the Ministerial Confer-
ence. 147 For ninety days after the proposal has been formally tabled,
the Ministerial Conference may decide by consensus whether to
submit the proposal to the members. 148 If an amendment is submitted
to the members that would affect substantive rights and obligations, a
two-third's majority is required, and the amendment will be binding
140. See id. (explaining that member governments have limited the total staffing,
blocked a Secretariat proposal to increase internal economic research, and quashed
plans for a major media relations effort).
141. See Jackson, supra note 82, at 68.
142. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 2.4
143. See Jackson, supra note 82. at 68.
144. See WTO Agreement, supra note 127. art 9.2.
145. See id. art. 10.3.
146. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 29.
147. See WTO Agreement, supra note 127, art. 10.1.
148. See id. (noting that if a consensus is reached, the Ministerial Conference
submits the proposition to the members). If a consensus cannot be reached, a two-
thirds majority is needed to submit the amendment to the members. See id.
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only upon the members who accept it. 149 All members must accept
any amendment to MFN or National Treatment. 1
50
As stated above, the WTO's voting procedure has been criticized
because the United States will have only one vote. 151 It is thought,
therefore, that WTO members will simply "gang up" on the United
States. In reality, the complaints about the WTO's voting procedure
are a distraction.152 First, WTO members are prohibited from using
the amendment procedure to expand or diminish the rights and obli-
gations of members.' 53 Even if a two-third's consensus is reached on
an amendment to a WTO agreement, however, the United States will
not be required to accept it. For an amendment to be binding on a
member, there must be a second vote taken requiring a three-fourth's
majority to force acceptance of the interpretation. 14 It is unlikely that
WTO members would attempt to force the United States to accept an
interpretation contrary to its interests, however, because they would
risk the United States' withdrawal from the WTO.
B. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
The new dispute settlement system is "a central element in pro-
viding security and predictability to the multilateral trading sys-
tem."1 55 The newly created DSB is responsible for consultations and
dispute settlement and has the "authority to establish panels, adopt
panel and Appellate Body reports," 156 and ensure the implementation
149. See id. art 10.3; see also id art. 10.2 and 10.6 (listing the Articles exempted
from the amendment procedure).
150. See id. art. 10.2.
151. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text (arguing that the granting of one
vote to the United States in WTO matters is not fair).
152. See HERITAGE LECTURES, supra note 7, at 3-4 (discussing how the WTO
Agreements threaten the power of American special interest groups that lobby for
protectionist legislation).
153. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 32.
154. See WTO Agreement, supra note 127, art. 10.5 (suggesting that in the event
that a three-fourth's majority did occur and the United States did not accept the
amendment, it would be free to withdraw from the WTO or remain with the con-
sent of the Ministerial Conference).
155. DSU, supra note 133, art. 3.2.
156. Id. art. 2.1.
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of panel rulings. 157 The DSB, however, may not add or diminish the
rights and obligations of members.1
5 8
The focus of the dispute settlement procedures is on the resolution
of differences through negotiation, not confrontation.159 Before
bringing a case, members should exercise judgment "as to whether
action under these [dispute settlement] procedures would be fruit-
ful,' 160 since it is preferable for parties to reach mutually acceptable
solutions to their disputes. 16 1 If the parties cannot solve their differ-
ences, however, the DSB attempts to effect the withdrawal of the
questioned measure if it is inconsistent with a UR Agreement.1
62
1. WTO Panel Procedure
If the United States believes another member has violated the
terms of an UR Agreement, the USTR has the right to request con-
sultations1 63 with the offending country, which must respond within
ten days. 164 If the requested party responds affirmatively, consulta-
tions must begin within thirty days. 165 If the requested party does not
respond, or responds negatively, then the United States may request
the formation of a panel. 166 The United States must notify the DSB of
the request for consultations, and if the parties cannot resolve their
dispute within sixty days after consultations begin, the United States
may request the establishment of a panel. 1
67
The DSB operates under a significantly improved panel procedure.
For the first time, maximum time limits have been established for
157. See id.
158. See id. art. 19.2.
159. See id art. 3.3 (noting that the prompt settlement of disputes "is essential to
the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance be-
tween the rights and obligations of Members").
160. Id. art. 3.7.
161. See id. art. 3.6.
162. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 3.7.
163. See id. art. 4.4 (explaining that any request for consultations must be in
writing, state the reasons for the request, identify the alleged offending measures,
and provide the legal basis for the complaint).
164. See id. art. 4.3 (noting that the parties may agree to a longer response pe-
riod than 10 days).
165. Seeid.
166. See id. art. 4.7.
167. See id.
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each stage of the dispute settlement process. 168 In order to improve
the quality of decisions, panelists must now have extensive trade ex-
perience. 169 A panel consists of three members, unless the parties
agree to enlarge it to five, 17 0 and the panel's function is to make ob-
jective assessments and findings that will assist the DSB in adopting
the panel report. 17'
In order to improve the quality of legal decisions, a panel may seek
advice from any individual or body it deems appropriate, 172 and the
panel has open ended authority to examine the issues brought before
it. Panels are also empowered to question, but not overrule, specific
uses of applications of domestic law, as well as the law's conformity
to the WTO agreements. 173 Once the parties agree upon panel com-
position, the panel shall have six months to conclude its work. 1
74
Prior to the first panel meeting, the parties must present written
submissions setting forth their respective cases. 175 At the first panel
meeting, the complainant presents its case and the responding party
replies. A second panel meeting follows at which the respondent of-
fers rebuttal and the complainant responds. 76 When arguments and
rebuttals have concluded, the panel deliberates and submits the fac-
168. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 27.
169. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 8.1.
[P]anels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel.
served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predeces-
sor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or
policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
Id.
170. See id. art. 8.5.
171. See id. art. 11.
172. See id. art. 13.1 (acknowledging that a panel has "the right to seek informa-
tion and technical advice from any individual or body it deems appropriate"). The
panel must notify the parties, however, if it seeks advice from a person or body
within the Member's jurisdiction. See id.
173. See id. art. II (stating that panels should make "an objective assessment of
the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant cov-
ered agreements.").
174. See id. art. 12.8 (requiring that the six-month rule is a general rule).
175. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 12.6 (noting that the complaining party shall
submit its submission before the responding party).
176. See id. art. 3.7.
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tual and argument portion of its report to the parties, who have a
limited time to comment on it.177
Next, the panel submits an interim report to the parties, containing
detailed findings and recommendations to the DSB.17 x The DSB may
not consider the panel report for adoption until twenty days after it
has been issued to the members, 179 who must register any objections
ten days prior to the DSB's consideration of the report.s o Once con-
sideration of the panel report begins, the disputants may participate
fully in the adoption process.181
2. Adoption of Panel Reports
The major change in panel procedure prevents members from
blocking the adoption of panel reports. The DSB adopts Panel reports
within sixty days after circulation to the members, unless a party to
the dispute provides notice of intent to appeal, or there is a consensus
not to adopt the panel report. 82 If a party notifies the DSB of its de-
cision to appeal, the DSB does not adopt the panel report until the
appeal is complete.
183
Within thirty days after the adoption of a panel report, the affected
party must notify the DSB of its intentions regarding implementa-
tion.184 If immediate compliance is not practical, the DSB provides
the affected party with a reasonable time for compliance. A new
GATT innovation calls for the permanent monitoring of implemen-
tation of adopted recommendations. 186 If a member fails to imple-
ment panel recommendations, or provide compensatory benefits
177. See id. art. 15.1
178. See id. art. 15.2.
179. See id. art. 16.1.
180. See id. art. 16.2.
181. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 16.3.
182. See id. art. 16.4.
183. See id.
184. See id. art. 21.3.
185. See id. A reasonable time can be determined in three wa~s: first, the losing
party can propose a time and the DSB may approve it; second, the parties may
mutually agree to a time "within 45 days following adoption of the recommenda-
tions and rulings"; third, "a period of time can be determined through binding arbi-
tration within 90 days following adoption of the recommendations and rulings." AL
186. See id. art. 21.6 (stating that -the DSB shall keep under surveillance the
implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings").
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within a reasonable time, the DSB automatically sanctions the mem-
ber.187 In the event of a disagreement over the amount and duration
of sanctions or time for compliance, the member has a right to expe-
dient arbitration. 188
C. THE APPELLATE BODY
The DSU created a standing Appellate Body, consisting of seven
members who serve three at a time for four year terms.189 Only par-
ties to the dispute may appeal panel decisions.19° Once a party pro-
vides written notice to the DSB of its appeal, the entire panel report
is sent to the Appellate Body, which must reach a decision within
sixty days of receiving the formal notice of appeal. 191
An appellate panel only reviews the issues of law covered in the
panel report. 192 The appellate panel may uphold, reverse, or modify a
panel's findings and conclusions, 193 but if it finds that a measure is
inconsistent with a WTO agreement, the appellate panel will recom-
mend that the offending party bring its trade measure into conformity
with the appropriate agreements. 194 Absent consensus not to adopt,
the DSB will adopt the Appellate Body's report within thirty days
after its circulation to the members.' 
95
187. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 22 (detailing that compensation and sanc-
tions are available if recommendations and rulings are not implemented in a rea-
sonable amount of time).
188. See id. art. 25.1 (providing that arbitration is subject to the agreement of the
parties, who shall agree upon the procedures).
189. See id. arts. 17.1-17.2 (detailing the selection and rotation procedures for
Appellate Body members).
190. See id. art. 17.4 (stating that third parties do not have a right to appeal, but a
third party who has notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the case may make
written submissions and be heard by the Appellate Body).
191. See id. art. 17. 5 (noting that proceedings shall not exceed sixty days from
the notice of intention to appeal). If the Appellate Body cannot meet its sixty day
deadline, it must notify the parties in writing, but in no case shall the proceedings
exceed ninety days. See id.
192. See id. art. 17.6.
193. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 17.13.
194. See id. arts. 19-19.1 (stating that the panel or Appellate Body may also sug-
gest ways for the member to implement the recommendations).
195. See id. art. 17.14.
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IV. UNITED STATES' CONCERNS ABOUT THE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
Despite the improved dispute settlement system, the system is not
perfect, and areas of concern exist for the United States. The quality
of panel decisions, especially appellate decisions, is a source of anxi-
ety. Concern exists over the potential lack of qualified judges, the
politicization of the judicial selection process, a lack of qualified
support staff, and an inability to deal with complex legal issues
within short time limits. 196 Furthermore, panel and appellate deci-
sions may conflict with one another because stare decisis19 7 does not
apply.1
98
Concern also exists over the secrecy of panel and appellate proce-
dures, which are not as open as the United States would like them.""
Both panel and Appellate Body deliberations are confidential,2U0 and
the opinions of individual parties remain anonymous. 201 Furthermore,
both groups draft reports without the parties to the dispute present.- -
Concerns notwithstanding, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
is more open than its GATT predecessor. The United States has the
right to participate in the selection of panelists, thus making it diffi-
cult for nations to "pack the court" with anti-American panelists.
2U3
The parties to the dispute must also submit non-confidential submis-
sions for release to the public prior to the adoption of the report,2°
and once a panel report is adopted, it is made available to the public.
196. See GAO Report, supra note 92, at 48.
197. See generally BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that
stare decisis is the policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
points).
198. See Jackson, supra note 82, at 70.
199. See GATT Hearing, supra note 1, at 42-3 (prepared statement of Ambassa-
dor Michael Kantor) (explaining that more needs to be done in the area of transpar-
ency).
200. See DSU, supra note 133, art. 14.1.
201. See id. art. 14.3, 17.11.
202. See id. art. 14.2, 17.10.
203. See GATT Hearing, supra note 1, at 42 (prepared statement of Ambassador
Michael Kantor) (explaining that the notion of America facing panels of "unquali-
fied, biased panelists.., is simply baseless").
204. See id.
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The implementing legislation also increases public access to the
dispute settlement process. 20 5 The USTR must publish information
on each dispute in which the United States is involved and is re-
quired to provide the public with an opportunity to submit comments
prior to the drafting of the United States' panel submissions. 206 Al-
though the DSB is more open than its GATT predecessor, the United
States recognizes that much more needs to be done.20 7
A. SECTION 301
A major area of concern for the United States is the future of Sec-
tion 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 20 8 which Congress created to protect209
American exports against unfair foreign trade practices. Section
301 provides "United States' petitioners and the Government with a
mechanism to enforce trade agreements, and to obtain the elimination
of unfair foreign trade practices."2t0
Under the original version of Section 301, the President had
authority to retaliate against trade restraints that were "unjustifiable,
unreasonable or discriminatory." If the alleged discriminatory
practice did not violate a trade agreement, the petitioner had to prove
that the practice burdened or restricted United States commerce. 21 2 If
the trade practice violated an agreement such as GATT, the petitioner
205. See id.
206. See id. (noting that the USTR will take comments from the public and Con-
gressional committees into consideration when preparing United States' submis-
sions to each dispute settlement panel).
207. See id. (stating that the United States is committed to obtaining greater
transparency in the WTO dispute settlement process).
208. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-310, 88 Stat. 1978,
2041-43 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2421 (1988)).
209. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 38, at 1300 (explaining that Section 301 is
the trade remedy designed to open foreign markets to U.S. exports and to achieve
improved protection of intellectual property rights and equitable rules of invest-
ment abroad).
210. Steven R. Phillips, The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Coln-
petitiveness Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'I.
L. 491, 503 (1989).
211. Id. at 504 (quoting the 1974 Trade Act and adding that it also gave the
President authority to take action against foreign countries' imports).
212. See id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(l)(B)(i) (1994)).
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only had to prove that the trade practice was inconsistent with
GATT, not that actual harm occurred.21 3
Section 301 is the leading "crowbar" used by the USTR in per-
suading reluctant trading partners to open their markets. -214 Under the
original Section 301, the President had significant discretion in de-
ciding whether to initiate action against an unfair trade practice,- -
and this displeased some members of Congress.21b' Thus, in 1979
Congress amended Section 301 by shortening the time in which the
President and the USTR could decide whether to take action. -t Con-
gress also inserted provisions for keeping petitioners better informed
during the Section 301 process 218 and for requiring the use of dispute
settlement in cases involving trade agreements.
2 19
Under the 1974 Section 301, the USTR had forty-five days after
receiving a complaint to decide whether to begin an investigation.
-220
If an investigation was initiated, the USTR attempted to settle the
matter through consultations. 22' If the case involved a trade agree-
ment and consultations failed, the USTR was required to seek formal
dispute resolution. 222 Then the USTR was required to make a rec-
ommendation to the President, who decided whether or not to take
action. To the dismay of some petitioners, the USTR seldom used its
power to initiate investigations. 223
213. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1994).
214. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 38, at 1300 (citing Walter S. Mossberg,
The Outlook: The Crowbar and the Handshake, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1989, at AI
(quoting Ambassador Carla Hills)).
215. See Phillips, supra note 210, at 509 (stating that the President had the
power to determine if the elements of Section 301 had been met and whether to
take action).
216. See id. at 508-09 (explaining that the President did not have to make spe-
cific determinations and could let a case die if he so chose).
217. See id. at 505 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2414 (1988)).
218. See id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2416 (1988) that requires the USTR to monitor
implementation of corrective trade measures by foreign governments).
219. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF
1979, S. REP. No. 249, at 234-35, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 624.
220. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (a)(2) (1988).
221. See Phillips, supra note 210. at 507 (referencing 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)
(1988)).
222. See id. (referencing 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1988)).
223. See id. (explaining that most of the requests for investigations came from
private industry).
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B. AMENDED SECTION 301
In 1988, prior to the Uruguay Round, Congress amended Section
301 to enable the USTR to address unfair foreign trade practices
more forcefully. The major change under the new Section 301 was
the transfer of some of the authority to take action from the President
224to the USTR. By transferring authority, Congress intended to limit
the President's discretion, increase the stature of the USTR and make
the use of Section 301 mandatory under certain conditions. 22 5 The
transfer of authority involved three areas: deciding whether a practice
226is actionable or unfair under Section 301, deciding on what action
227 228to take, and implementing the chosen action.
Under the 1988 Section 301, the USTR must decide, within forty-
five days of receiving a petition, whether to begin an investigation of
the alleged unfair practice.229 If the USTR investigates and finds that
a foreign trade practice denies the United States its rights under a
trade agreement, the USTR must take action. 23 Once the office of
the USTR takes action, 23 it must implement this action within thirty
days, subject to the approval of the President.
232
The successful use of Section 301 created strong Congressional
support for even broader and stronger use of this mechanism to per-
suade trading partners to open markets. 233 Consequently, the 1988
Trade Act created two stronger versions of Section 301. "Special"
301 provided greater protection for intellectual property rights by
mandating that the USTR identify and investigate countries failing to
224. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
225. See Phillips, supra note 210, at 509.
226. See 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(A) (1994).
227. See id. § 2414(a)(1)(B).
228. See id. § 2415(a)(1).
229. See id. § 2412(a)(2).
230. See id. § 2411(a).
231. See id. § 2411(c)(1)(A) and (B) (stating that the USTR may suspend or
withdraw trade benefits and impose duties or other import restrictions).
232. See 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1994).
233. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 38, at 1301 (explaining Congress' thinking
that if Section 301 worked in the past, then new variations of it would work in the
future).
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provide adequate protection.234 "Super" 301 required that the USTR
annually identify foreign practices-such as import barriers and trade
distorting measures-that burden United States' commerce. 235 After
identifying the discriminatory practices, the USTR must then choose
priority countries where elimination of the measures would have the
most significant potential to increase United States' exports.236 Once
countries have been identified, the USTR must seek consultations
with the offending nations to eliminate the practice; 237 and if nego-
tiations are not successful, the USTR must initiate dollar for dollar
retaliation.238
America's trading partners widely condemned the creation of Spe-
cial and Super 301 as examples of aggressive unilateralism that un-
dermined both the United States' commitment to the GATI and the
GATf system itself.239 Attempting to soothe its trading partners, the
United States assured them that it would only use Section 301 when
its rights were not adequately protected. 240 Despite these reassur-
ances, when the United States created Section 301, it sent a strong
message that it intends to protect its own trade interests. Because
Section 301 is despised by America's trading partners, however,
there is the possibility that it will be challenged in the DSB.2"
The WTO is arguably broader in scope than the GATT and covers
more areas of trade. For example, the WTO protects intellectual
property rights and, to a certain extent, trade in services, whereas the
GATT applies only to products.242 As a consequence, the limitations
on unilateral actions by members of the WTO will probably in-
crease.243 Consequently, the United States' use of Section 301 will
234. See 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1988)); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1994) (requiring
the USTR to report to Congress annually those countries that deny adequate pro-
tection of intellectual property rights).
235. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 38 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988))
236. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(B) (1994).
237. See id. § 2420(c) (stating that the USTR is required to request consultations
under 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)).
238. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
239. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 2761-62 (explaining that the EC and Japan
were particularly upset with the mandatory action required by Super 301).
240. See id.
241. See GATT Hearing, supra note 1, at 355 (statement of Ralph Nader) (as-
serting that America's trading partners cannot wait to challenge Section 301).
242. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 38, at 1306.
243. See id.
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have to be more judicious. 244 The key point, however, is that the
WTO cannot require the United States to eliminate Section 301, and
in the event of a conflict with a UR Agreement, Section 301 takes
precedence. Furthermore, in the event the United States wins a panel
decision and the loser refuses to comply, the United States could use
245Section 301 as authorized retaliation.
Section 301 has not been challenged in the DSB. Nonetheless,
even if Section 301 is challenged and found violative of an UR
Agreement, the United States cannot be forced to stop using it. Sec-
tion 301 is too powerful a tool in opening foreign markets 2 6 for the
247United States to abandon its use.
V. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT OVERVIEW
America's assessment of the WTO will depend largely on how it
fares as a complainant and respondent at the DSB. Thus far, the
United States has achieved mixed results as a complainant, winning
several panel decisions and losing several, including the "Fuji Film"
case. 248 On the whole, WTO members have brought three successful
complaints against the United States, including the "Dirty Oil"
case.
249
In the case of "Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages," the United States
challenged a Japanese tax law that treated Japanese alcoholic bever-
ages more favorably than imported ones. 250 On September 27, 1995,
244. See id. at 1308 (explaining that the United States will have to weigh the
potential costs and benefits more closely before using Section 301).
245. See id. at 1306-07.
246. See Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note 60, at 133 (prepared state-
ment of Steven Appleton, President and CEO of Microcon Semiconductor) (ex-
plaining that the United States gained access to Japanese markets only through the
use of Section 301).
247. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 38, at 1300 n.24 (explaining that the
United States has used Section 301 against Japan (beef, cigarettes, citrus, forest
products, processed fruits, satellites, supercomputers, and vegetables); Korea (beef,
cigarettes, insurance, and intellectual property protection); the EC (citrus, govern-
inent procurement, and pasta); and Brazil (computers and patent protection for
pharmaceutical products)).
248. See infra pt. V.A.
249. See infra pt. V.B.
250. See Dispute Overview, supra note 25. The EC and Canada also brought
complaints against Japan. See id.
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the DSB formed a panel, which circulated its report to the members
on July 11, 1996. In its report, the panel agreed with the United
States that the challenged Japanese law violated GATT Article 111:2.
Japan subsequently appealed, and the Appellate Body issued its re-
port on October 4, 1996, upholding the panel's report regarding
GATT Article 11:2.251 On November 1, 1996, the DSB adopted both
the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified.252 On
December 24, 1996, the United States requested binding arbitration
to determine a reasonable time for Japan's compliance with the
panel's recommendations.253 The arbitrator issued his report on Feb-
ruary 14, 1997, establishing a fifteen-month deadline for compli-
ance.
254
In the case of "Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals," the
United States brought a complaint against Canada for prohibiting and
restricting the importation of periodicals in violation of GATT Arti-
cle XI.255 The DSB established a panel on June 19, 1996. On March
14, 1997, the panel circulated its report to the members, finding that
the measures used by Canada violated the GATT. 25" Canada subse-
quently filed an appeal, and the Appellate Body partially upheld the
decision of the panel.257 On July 30, 1997. the DSB adopted both the
Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified.
The United States also brought a successful complaint against the
"European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas." In its complaint, the United States alleged,
inter alia, that the EC's regime for importation, sale, and distribution
251. See id. (noting that despite upholding the panel's finding, the Appellate




255. See id. (stating that the United States also alleged that Canadian tax rates on
certain periodicals, as well as the application of favorable postage rates, were in
violation of GATT Article III).
256. See Dispute Overview. supra note 25.
257. See id. (stating that "the Appellate Body upheld the panel's findings and
conclusions on the applicability of GATT 1994 to Part V. I of Canada's Excise Tax
Act but reversed the panel's finding that Part V. 1 of the Excise Act is inconsistent
with the first sentence of Article 111:2 of GATT 1994"1. The Appellate Body also
ruled that Part V.1 of Canada's Excise Tax Act was inconsistent with the second
sentence of GATT Article I1I:2 and reversed the panel's decision that Canada's
postal rate scheme was justified by GATT Article I11:8b). See it].
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of bananas was inconsistent with GATT Articles I, II, 1I1, X, XI, and
XIII. 258 The panel, formed on May 8, 1996, agreed that the EC's re-
gime violated GATT and circulated its report to the members on May
22, 1997. 25' The EC appealed the panel's decision, but the Appellate
Body upheld most of the panel report. 26 The DSB adopted both the
Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified, on Septem-
ber 25, 1997.261
As shown by the above-mentioned cases, the United States has
achieved success at the DSB. Dispute settlement, however, is a two-
way street, and WTO members have brought successful complaints
against the United States for its own discriminatory trade practices.
In the case of" Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fi-
bre Underwear," Costa Rica brought a complaint against the United
States, alleging that restrictions on textile imports violated the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.262 The panel agreed with Costa
Rica and circulated its report to the members on November 8,
1996.263 Costa Rica unsuccessfully appealed part of the panel report,
and on February 25, 1997, the DSB adopted both the Appellate Body
264and panel reports. Despite losing the complaint, however, the
United States' future compliance was moot because the discrimina-
tory measure in question expired and was not renewed.265
In the case of a "Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses," India brought a complaint asserting that the
United States used a safeguard measure that violated Articles 2, 6,266
and 8 of the ATC. The panel agreed with India and circulated its
report on January 6, 1996. India appealed part of the panel report,
258. See id. (stating that Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico also
brought complaints against the EC).
259. See id.
260. See id. (stating that the Appellate Body reversed the panel finding that the
EC's regime violated both GATT Article X and the Import Licensing Agreement).
261. See id.
262. See Dispute Overview, supra note 25.
263. See id.
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but the Appellate Body upheld the panel report.2 68 The DSB subse-
quently adopted the Appellate Body and panel reports, as modified,
on May 23, 1997.269
Despite the abundance of DSB panels, however, WTO officials do
not want the organization characterized as the "international cop on
the trade beat."270 The WTO Deputy Director General has stated that
the WTO is a negotiation and dispute resolution forum that functions
best as a catalyst, not an enforcement mechanism.
27'
A. THE FUJI FILM CASE
To date, the most significant panel loss for the United States has
been the "Fuji Film" case. The case was significant for two reasons:
it was the first time the United States lost as a complainant, and the
case was considered the first real test for the fledgling WTO. -2
The Kodak Corporation had long believed that the Japanese gov-
ernment conspired to keep foreign film out of Japan. -73 In June 1996,
the United States requested consultations with Japan regarding its
laws on the distribution and sale of imported film and photographic
paper.274 The United States ultimately brought a complaint to the
DSB, alleging that Japanese laws treated Japanese film more favora-
bly, thus violating GATT Articles II and X.
275
The DSB formed a panel on October 16, 1996, -76 and on February
20, 1997, the United States submitted its case against Japan, pre-
senting evidence of thirty years of Japanese efforts to exclude foreign
film and paper.2 77 In a decision described as "devastating," the
268. See Dispute Overview, supra note 25.
269. See id.
270. Stokes, supra note 139, at 710-11.
271. See id.
272. See Lorraine Woellert, Kodak, U.S. Lose Trade Dispute, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1997, at Al.
273. See Frances Williams, U.S. Takes Kodak-Fuji Film Case to 117O, FIN.
TRMES, Feb. 21, 1997, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS File (stating that the
United States argued that since the 1960s, Japan has neutralized tariff cuts on pho-
tographic film by using laws and regulations to bolster Fuji's position within the
domestic market).
274. See generally Dispute Overview, supra note 25.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See Williams, supra note 273.
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panel's December 5, 1997 report overwhelmingly rejected every sin-
gle point of the United States' complaint.
278
The loss was especially disappointing to the United States business
community, which thought the case had the potential to open Japan's
markets to other foreign-made products. 279 The panel decision has
shaken some of the WTO's most ardent supporters and has revived
fears among critics that the WTO is incapable of adjudicating com-
plex cases.
280
The United States is considering its options, but will no doubt ap-
peal the panel's decision. The administration is also considering a
Section 301 investigation. 28 1 Placing sanctions on Japan, however,
would send the message that the United States will abide by the
WTO's decisions so long as those decisions favor the United
282States. Thus, United States sanctions could cast doubt upon
America's commitment to the WTO and could spark a trade war with
Japan. Furthermore, applying sanctions would make the United
States appear hypocritical because it advocated a stronger dispute
resolution system at the Uruguay Round.
B. THE DIRTY OIL CASE
In 1990, Congress amended the Clean Air Act 283 and mandated
that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") implement regu-
lations setting acceptable pollution levels for gasoline. 284 In 1994, the
EPA implemented the required regulations, which came to be known
as the "Gasoline Rule. 285 On January 23, 1995, Venezuela sent a re-
quest for consultations to the United States regarding the "Gasoline
Rule.",286 The parties consulted on February 24, 1995, and were un-
278. See Woellert, supra note 272.
279. See id; see also Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Kodak Lose Japan Trade Suit, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at DI (noting that American firms hoped the case would be
the "crowbar" that hastened the opening of the Japanese market).
280. See Iritani, supra note 279.
281. See Woellert. supra note 272.
282. See Iritani, supra note 279.
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994).
284. See Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274, para. 2.1 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter Panel Reporti.
285. 40 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1994).
286. See Panel Report, supra note 284, para. 1. 1.
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successful in resolving their differences. 287 Consequently, Venezuela
requested the establishment of a panel, which the DSB created on
April 10, 1995.288 On the same day, Brazil requested consultations
with the United States regarding the "Gasoline Rule.'"29 The parties
consulted on May 1, 1995, without a satisfactory result, and Brazil
subsequently requested a panel, which the DSB established on May
19, 1995.290
The "Gasoline Rule" required that as of January 1, 1995, each im-
porter's gasoline sold in the United States contain levels of pollutants
no higher than the gasoline sold in the United States by that importer
in 1990.291 The "Gasoline Rule" allowed United States' oil refiners
to set their own baseline pollution levels against which to measure
gasoline produced in the future.2 92 Foreign oil refiners, however,
were not given the option of establishing an individual baseline.
Therefore, gasoline from Venezuela and Brazil was barred from the
United States because it contained unacceptable levels of pollutants,
while gasoline of the same quality continued to be sold domesti-
cally.
294
Venezuela 295 and Brazil asked that the panel find that the baseline
provisions of the "Gasoline Rule" violate Articles I and III of the
296GAIT. 9 They also requested the panel to recommend that the
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. para. 1.2.
290. See id.
291. See Panel Report, supra note 284. para. 2.11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545
(1994)).
292. See id.
293. See Appellate Body Report, United States, Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, at 610 (May 1996) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Report].
294. See William F. Buckley Jr., Has the 11TO Threatened Us?, CONSERVATIVE
CHRON., Feb. 7, 1996, at 30.
295. See SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VENEZUELA TO THE WTO DISPUTE SEsrrEMENT BODY IN U.S. MEASURES ON
GASOLINE 2 (1994) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS] (noting Venezuela's
objection to the baseline provisions because the) offered American oil refiners
three ways to reformulate their gasoline to meet the EPA standards but only offered
foreign refiners one of those three options).
296. See Panel Report, supra note 284, para. 3.1. The complainants also asserted
that the baseline provisions of the "Gasoline Rule" were not covered by any excep-
tion under GATT Article XX. the general exceptions provision. See hi.
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United States take appropriate action to bring the "Gasoline Rule"
into conformity with its GATT obligations. 297 The panel met with the
parties on July 10-12 and September 13-15, 1995.298 On September
21, 1995, the panel's Chairman told the DSB that the panel could not
complete its final report within six months.299 The panel issued an
interim report on December 11, 1995300 and issued its final report on
January 17, 1996. 3° 1 In its final report, the panel disagreed with the
United States and concluded that the baseline provisions of the
"Gasoline Rule" were inconsistent with GATT Article JIl. The panel
also determined that the baseline provisions could not be justified
under GATT Article XX (b), (d), or (g).302 The panel thus recom-
mended that the DSB request that the United States bring this part of
the "Gasoline Rule" into conformity with GATT provisions. 
3 0 3
The United States promptly notified the DSB and Appellate Body
of its decision to appeal. 304 Interestingly, the United States' appeal
was sharply limited in scope, challenging only the panel's ruling that
the baseline establishment rules were inconsistent with GATT Arti-
cle XX(g). 30 5 A hearing was held on March 27-28, 1996,306 and the
Appellate Body issued its report on April 22, 1996, recommending
that the DSB request that the United States bring the baseline portion
of the "Gasoline Rule" into conformity with GATT obligations.
307
297. See id. para. 3.3.
298. See id. para. 1.7. On July 11, 1995, the panel met with the interested third
parties: Australia, Canada, the EC, and Norway. See id. paras. 1.6-1.7.
299. See id. para. 1.8
300. See id. para. 1.9.
301. See id.
302. See Panel Report, supra note 284, para. 8. 1.
303. See id. para. 8.2.
304. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 293, at 606-07.
305. See id. at 8. GATT provides that the Agreement does not prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by any contracting party of measures relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are taken in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. See GATT, supra note 75, art.
XX(g).
306. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 293, at 607. The participants, as
well as third parties, orally argued and responded to questions from the panelists,
and both participants and third parties were invited to submit final written state-
ments of their positions. See id.
307. See id. at 633. The Appellate Body modified the Panel's report by finding
that the "Gasoline Rule" fit under GATT Article XX(g) but ruled that Article XX
was inapplicable in the case. See id.
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Once the DSB adopted the Appellate Body Report, the United
States had three choices: it could ignore the panel report and accept
308 
:
sanctions, amend the "Gasoline Rule," or withdraw from the
WTO. On August 27, 1997, the EPA amended the "Gasoline Rule"
to allow a foreign refiner to petition the EPA to establish its own in-
dividual baseline.
30 9
Despite losing the panel decision and amending the "Gasoline
Rule," the United States surrendered none of its ability to implement
environmental legislation.31° The simple fact is that the original
"Gasoline Rule" discriminated against foreign refiners. 311 If the
United States intends to use the dispute settlement mechanism to cor-
rect discriminatory practices, it must be willing to amend its own dis-
criminatory practices.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of contrary assertions, the United States has not sur-
rendered its sovereignty by joining the WTO. In fact, American sov-
ereignty is protected in several ways. First, Congress passed imple-
menting legislation that ensures United States' law takes precedence
in the event of a conflict with one of the UR Agreements. The im-
plementing bill also provides that WTO decisions do not have the
power to change United States law. Second, the institutional structure
of the WTO protects its members' sovereignty. 3 2 For instance, the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council may not use voting
procedures to diminish America's rights, and if one of the UR
308. See HERITAGE LECTURES, supra note 7. at 3-4 (noting that the WN'TO may
impose sanctions on a violating state in order to compensate those states that suf-
fered as a result of the GATT violation).
309. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). The
baseline established must reflect the quality and quantity of gasoline produced at a
foreign refinery in 1990 that was shipped to the United States. See id.
310. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 293, at 633-34. The Appellate Body
emphasized that members' ability to protect the environment was not at issue. See
id.
311. See SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS, supra note 295, at 2 (stating that Vene-
zuela offered evidence that the United States sold gasoline with the same level of
pollutants as the Venezuelan gasoline being barred).
312. See Stokes, supra note 139, at 710-11 (explaining that the WTO is to func-
tion as a negotiation and dispute resolution forum and not as an "international cop
on the trade beat').
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Agreements is amended, the United States is not obligated to accept
the amendment. Under the DSB, panels may recommend that mem-
bers change their trade practices but cannot force a member to obey.
Finally, if necessary, the United States may withdraw its membership
from the WTO.
It is important to remember that the United States advocated for a
stronger international dispute resolution system 31 3 and that the DSB
is much improved over its GATT predecessor. Under the previous
GATT, members could block panel reports indefinitely, panels did
not have time limits for deciding cases, and no automatic right of ap-
peal existed. Under the WTO, panel reports will be adopted absent
consensus not to adopt, panels and appellate panels must decide
cases within set time limits, and there is an automatic right of appeal.
As the most prolific user of the dispute settlement system, the
United States has more to gain from the WTO than any other na-
tion. 314 As Ambassador Michael Kantor stated, for the first time all
WTO members must sign on to all the UR Agreements and must play
by the same rules.315 Moreover, the UR Agreements now extend to
services and intellectual property, two areas of great importance to
the United States.
However, no system is perfect, and panels will not decide all cases
correctly. Panels will make mistakes, and members will lose cases
they should win. However, members will also win cases they should
lose. Such a situation is similar to bringing a case in American
courts. Despite its flaws, "there is a great deal of utility in a credit-
able and efficient rule oriented dispute settlement system that has in-
tegrity, and the United States is an important beneficiary of such a
system."
316
The United States has achieved success at the DSB, as well as dis-
appointments. America was not happy when it lost the "Dirty Oil"
313. See 141 CONG. REC. S176 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob
Dole) (arguing that an effective dispute resolution system was a major American
negotiating objective at the Uruguay Round).
314. See Buckley, supra note 294, at 30 (explaining that most trade discrimina-
tion occurs against American producers, and therefore, the United States has more
to gain than lose from the WTO).
315. See GATT Hearing, supra note 1, at 39.
316. Jackson, supra note 82, at 71.
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case, but the panel properly decided that the "Gasoline Rule" was
discriminatory. The "Fuji Film" case was a bitter loss, but the United
States has an automatic right of appeal and will use it. If the Appel-
late Body upholds the panel report, the United States can still take
action under Section 301 against Japan. Although imposing sanctions
would have a negative impact on the WTO. the fact is that the WTO
cannot prevent the United States from making the sovereign decision
to impose sanctions.
Undoubtedly, complex politically charged cases will continue to
challenge the WTO and the DSB, for it is likely that another Helms-
Burton case or another "Fuji Film" case lurks somewhere in the fu-
ture. With such an ambitious purpose, the WTO must anticipate these
challenges. Imperfections notwithstanding, the WTO offers stability
and a legal order for dispute resolution lacking in the previous
GATT, and it offers these things while respecting the sovereignty of
its members.
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